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ABSTRACT
Studies using the Imagination Inflation procedure typically find that likelihood ratings for
imagined events increase relative to ratings for unimagined events. However, the
standard methodology does not distinguish what procedural elements cause these
changes, nor what aspects of “remembering” are affected. The present study was
designed to disentangle the effects of prevalence information and different levels of event
exposure on a variety of ratings regarding past events (plausibility, autobiographical
belief, memory). One hundred and thirty three undergraduate participants were assigned
to one of three levels of exposure (control, description, visualization) to an unlikely
childhood event, half of which also received false prevalence information about the
event. Results failed to replicate previous studies. Neither likelihood judgments, belief,
nor memory were impacted by the manipulations. Plausibility ratings were impacted by
prevalence information, and exposure additionally influenced personal plausibility
ratings. Imagination inflation procedures appear to be more intricate than previously
acknowledged.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks and
appreciation to a number of people who were instrumental in the completion of this
project. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Alan Scoboria, for
all of his guidance, insight, and support. His advice and encouragement to think critically
have been invaluable throughout the duration of this study. I would also like to express
my deepest gratitude to the members of my supervisory committee, Dr. Anne Baird and
Dr. Robert Arnold, whose knowledge and guidance contributed to making this project a
success. As well, I would like to recognize my valued research assistants, Kathryn
Hodwitz, Stacey Hamilton, Lindsay Hickey, Vanessa McColl, Justin Gates, and Maria
Soubbotina, without whom this study could not have been possible.
On a personal note, I am deeply indebted to my family for providing me with the
love and encouragement I needed to complete this project. Finally, I would like to thank
Melanie Krochmalnek, Cameron Freese, and Marnie Pellett for their unwavering
friendship and support throughout this endeavor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

LIST OF TABLES

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

ix

I.

INTRODUCTION
Overview

1

Context of the Problem

1

Methodological Deficits in Independent Variables

2

Methodological Deficits in Dependent Variable

3

Imagination Inflation Findings

4

Exposure to Event

8

Plausibility

10

Limitations

15

Present Study

16

Hypotheses
II.

1

16

METHOD

22

Participants

22

Participant Number and Characteristics
Measures and Apparatus

22
23

Life Events Inventory

23

Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation
Target Events

25

Script Information

25

Prevalence Information

26

Filler Task

27

Procedure

III.

IV.

27

Phase 1

27

Phase 2

27

Conditions

28

RESULTS

31

Preliminary Analysis

31

Analysis of Change Scores

33

Hypothesis 1

37

Hypothesis 2

37

Hypothesis 3

41

Hypothesis 4

41

Analysis of Change Proportions

41

Hypothesis 5

45

DISCUSSION

46

Review of Purpose and Hypotheses

46

Review of Primary Research Questions

46

Hypothesis 1

46

Hypothesis 2

48

Hypothesis 3

49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

vii

Hypothesis 4

49

Analysis of Change Proportions

51

Hypothesis 5

52

Limitations

53

Future Directions

54

WORKS CITED

58

APPENDICES

62

A. Number of Participants per Cell

62

B. Life Events Inventory

63

C. Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire

64

D. Script and Prevalence Information

70

E. Diabetes Narrative

74

F. Consent Forms

77

G. ANOVA and ANCOVA tables

81

H. Time 2 Scores and Standard Deviations

86

I. Graphical Depiction of the Effects

87

VITA AUCTORIS

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

Imagination Inflation

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of all Individuals Tested at
Baseline.........................................................................................................

32

Table 2

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Adjusted Sample at Baseline...

34

Table 3

Mean Change Scores and Standard Deviations for Adjusted Sample

36

Table 4

Proportions Increasing for Adjusted Sample..................................

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1

Predicted Effects...............................................................................................

19

Figure 2

Effect of Prevalence across Levels of Exposure for General Plausibility...

39

Figure 3

Effect of Prevalence across Levels of Exposure for Personal Plausibility..

40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

1

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Context o f the Problem
A great deal of research has been conducted to investigate the degree to which
false memories can be suggested to adults. Prior research has demonstrated that memory
is malleable and can be impacted by various forms of information, including post-event
information, suggestions, and exposure to details (Loftus, 2002). This has far-reaching
implications, as interactions in both legal and therapeutic contexts often involve
procedures that may influence the information that individuals recall. Imagination is one
factor that has been shown to influence memory creation for events that never occurred
(e.g., Hyman, Husband & Billings, 1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2002). A number
of paradigms have been developed to explore the impact of imagination upon memory for
childhood events. These studies have demonstrated that imagination facilitates the
creation of entirely false childhood memories (e.g., Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni &
Memon, 2002, etc.), as well as misconstruals regarding recently performed actions (Goff
& Roediger, 1998; Thomas & Loftus, 2002).
One prominent approach to studying the influence of imagination upon memory is
the “Imagination Inflation” paradigm (Garry et al., 1996). Building upon research in
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Kohler, 1991), such studies explore whether having
participants imagine hypothetical events influences their ratings regarding the likelihood
that the events occurred during childhood. Procedurally, participants in these studies are
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asked to rate the likelihood that events occurred to them in childhood. They are then
asked to imagine a subset of these events and, subsequently, to complete the likelihood
ratings a second time. Typically, likelihood ratings for imagined events in adults increase
relative to ratings of events that have not been imagined (Garry et al., 1996; Goff &
Roediger, 1998; Wade et al, 2002; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Paddock et al., 1998). This
change in scores for imagined events as contrasted with non-imagined events is referred
to as imagination inflation.
Methodological Deficits in Independent Variables
Ambiguity remains, however, as to what mechanisms specifically cause the
observed changes in event ratings within this design. A range of variables are present
within the imagination procedure that have yet to be systematically disentangled. Several
of these variables will be addressed in the present work, including: 1) describing an event
in the absence of encouraged visualization, 2) forming mental images of an event, and 3)
altering the degree to which an event seems credible. Each of these factors may
independently or additively impact the post manipulation likelihood ratings, as each has
been shown to affect perceptions of the past in other areas of study (e.g., Bernstein et al.,
2002; Sharman, Garry & Beuke, 2004; Sharman, Manning & Garry, 2005; Scoboria,
Mazzoni, Kirsch & Jimenez, 2006). Yet, within the imagination inflation paradigm,
researchers have predominantly argued that the change in ratings is achieved through
“imagination” as a whole without looking at the specific procedural elements that might
be contributing to the outcome (however, see Sharman, Garry, & Beuke, 2004 for an
alternate explanation). Accordingly, one purpose of the current study is to disentangle
several key aspects of the imagination inflation procedure (i.e., event exposure and
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plausibility) to discern what aspects of the methodology typically used in such studies are
impacting changes in ratings.
Methodological Deficits in Dependent Variable
Furthermore, there is also debate as to what is actually being measured in these
studies. Within the imagination inflation paradigm, event ratings are typically assessed
using the Life Events Inventory (LEI; Mazzoni & Loftus, 1996). The LEI measures how
confident participants are that they experienced a series of childhood events. Some
researchers have assumed that the LEI measures the likelihood of occurrence of
childhood events, whereas other researchers contend that the LEI measures memory for
events (see Garry et al., 2001 for an alternate explanation). Nevertheless, it currently
remains “unknown to what degree findings using the LEI reflect ratings based upon
belief or memory” (Scoboria, 2006, p.343). The distinction between these constructs
needs to be acknowledged, as many people hold autobiographical beliefs for events that
they cannot remember. Some of these beliefs may be derived from memories, while other
beliefs may come from other sources; for example, people believe that they were bom
without having a recollection of the event. Scoboria et al. (2006) demonstrated that only a
small subset of the participants who erroneously maintained that they had a belief about a
childhood event also reported false memories of the event. Consequently, there are
limitations to the applicability of much of the current research, given that this uncertainty
regarding whether individuals are reporting beliefs or memories limits the ability to
understand the results (Smeets, 2005). To address these measurement concerns, Scoboria
et al. (2004) have built upon related models (e.g., Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001) and
have conceptually distinguished autobiographical memory, having a recollection of an
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event; autobiographical belief, believing that an event occurred, whether or not it is
remembered; and plausibility, judging that an event could have occurred. In addition, a
further distinction has been made between general and personal plausibility. General
plausibility refers to the judgment of whether an event could have occurred, regardless of
to whom, whereas personal plausibility is a judgment that is made regarding whether the
event could have occurred specifically to the individual.
A new measure, the Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ;
Scoboria et al., 2004), was developed to capture these different aspects of the
remembering process. The ABMQ asks respondents to rate general and personal
plausibility, belief, and memory separately. Scoboria et al. (2004) maintain that these are
nested constructs, such that memory implies belief and belief implies plausibility,
although the reverse is not true under most circumstances. Although these constructs are
all related in that they have to do with the perceived occurrence for an event, they have
been shown to be empirically and conceptually distinct concepts (Scoboria et al., 2004).
Accordingly, the current study will also measure individuals’ ratings of events using the
ABMQ and LEI; this will allow us to determine which of these distinct aspects of
“remembering” are being impacted by the different processes involved in the imagination
inflation paradigm.
Imagination Inflation Findings
Studies have continually demonstrated an increase in post-test ratings using the
imagination inflation paradigm (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Paddock et
al., 1998; Paddock et al., 1999; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Although the procedures used
in this body of research have varied in terms of how individuals are asked to imagine
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events (i.e., through a booklet or guided imagery) and in terms of the cover story that
they are presented with, the change in scores has been consistently replicated. These
studies have predominantly argued that “when people vividly imagine or visualize
personal childhood events, their subjective confidence increases in the probability that
these visualized incidents actually occurred” (Paddock et al., 1998, p.63).
In the initial imagination inflation design (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman,
1996), participants were told that the experimenters were interested in how vividly people
could imagine events. The LEI was administered to collect baseline data on how
frequently the events actually occurred. Two weeks later, individuals were given a
package with written descriptions of four critical items taken from the LEI. Participants
were asked to read each description, visualize the event for a few moments, and then
answer questions about the image they had created. Participants were then given
additional information to imagine, after which they would again answer a few questions.
Individuals were asked to picture the event as clearly as possible and were told to close
their eyes if this helped them to do so. This basic procedure was repeated for all four
target items and lasted about 2 minutes per item. Participants were then told that their
original LEI scores had been lost and were asked to complete the forms again. For target
items, imagination resulted in increased confidence that the event had occurred in
childhood.
Mazzoni and Memon (2003) wanted to further ensure that the events that
participants were imagining had not previously occurred in order to be certain that
individuals were creating false memories and not engaging in a process of remembering
events that had actually been experienced. To do this, participants were provided with an
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event that the researchers knew had not been experienced by individuals in the participant
population: having a school nurse remove a skin sample. This event was provided along
with an event that could have happened (having a milk tooth extracted). To ensure that
the inflation was not being caused by mere exposure, each participant was asked to
imagine a given event and to read a short passage and answer questions about the other
event. It was presumed that if the change scores in the imagination condition were
significantly greater than change scores for the mere exposure group, then the
imagination process would be responsible for any increase in beliefs and memories above
that of exposure. Results indicated that imagination alone led to “increases in the
participants’ convictions that an event had occurred in their childhood” for events that
both could and could not have occurred (p. 188). Further, imagination provided greater
confidence in the events than mere exposure.
In explaining the effect of imagination upon likelihood/confidence ratings, some
have argued that visualization likely results in a mental representation similar to that
which would occur from experiencing the event, as a visualization often drives
individuals to “produce a more concrete, specific, and perceptually and semantically
detailed version of the incident” (Paddock, Terranova, Kwok, & Halpem, 2000, p.l).
Accordingly, there is a great deal of similarity between the representation of a true past
event, and that of an imagined event. The visualization process may thus be associated
with false memory creation, as the source of the imagery may later become confused, and
individuals may misattribute the imagined event to having been a real event. This error in
attribution, referred to as a source monitoring error, may well lead individuals to “believe
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that an externally suggested event is an internally generated recollection” (Garry et al.,
1996, p. 102).
The source-monitoring framework asserts that “people do not typically directly
retrieve an abstract tag or label that specifies a memory’s source” (Johnson, Hashtroudi,
& Lindsay, 1993, p.3). Rather, individuals attribute their memories to particular sources
through a decision making process at the time of remembering. Individuals, however,
often have trouble discriminating between the possible origins of a remembered event.
“Many source-monitoring decisions are made rapidly and relatively nondeliberatively on
the basis of qualitative characteristics of activated memories (e.g., amount of perceptual
detail)” (p. 4). Memories for perceived events often include more perceptual and
contextual details than memories for imagined events. Thus, memories and non
memories are often distinguished from one another via the relative amount of perceptual
details included in the recollection. Confusion is thus increased by enhancing perceptual
details for imagined events, leading to a greater similarity between perceived and
imagined events (p.6). According to this argument, after visualizing an event during the
imagination process, individuals may later have trouble discriminating the origin of their
images and may, subsequently, misattribute the images to being a recollection of a past
event.
Despite these findings, many people “daydream and imagine a variety of
scenarios and outcomes yet don’t routinely get confused between what really happened
and what did not” (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). Therefore, there may be
other factors embedded within the imagination inflation procedure that promote the
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acceptance of fictitious childhood events. One likely candidate is the sense of familiarity
for events.
Exposure to Event
Bernstein, Whittlesea, and Loftus (2002) argue that enhancement of perceptual
detail is not essential to increase an individual’s perception that an event occurred. They
assert that it is an increase in familiarity for events, whether through imagination or some
other cognitive task, which has the potential to cause inflation. In their study, Bernstein et
al. provided participants with a list of event descriptions, some of which had an anagram
embedded within the event (e.g., broke a dwniwo playing ball), which had to be
unscrambled in order to understand the description and rate the event. For each event, the
participants had to report whether the event had been personally experienced before the
age of 10. The results indicated that participants were more confident that they had
experienced the scrambled events when compared to the unscrambled events. This
suggests that unscrambling the anagram created a greater sense of familiarity with the
event, which was then misattributed to having likely experienced the event before
(Bernstein et al., 2002).
Similarly, Sharman, Garry, and Beuke (2004) used the standard imagination
inflation procedure; however, they had individuals either imagine or paraphrase the
fictitious childhood event prior to rating their confidence a second time. In the paraphrase
condition, participants were presented with a target event along with instructions to
paraphrase (reword) it in as many ways as possible. They hypothesized that the more
imagination “works to enhance qualitative, visual event characteristics, the more likely it
is that only imagination will produce the inflation” if visualization is responsible for the
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effect (p.3). However, it could not be determined whether individuals engaged in
imagination during the paraphrase task. Results, nevertheless, indicated that participants
became more confident that the event happened in childhood, regardless of whether it
was imagined or paraphrased. As with Bernstein et al.’s (2002) results, this study
demonstrated that engaging with a given event “can be enough to inflate confidence that
the experiences were real” (Sharman, Garry, & Beuke, 2004, p.7).
Sharman, Manning, and Garry (2005) further examined whether explaining a
hypothetical childhood event, in the absence of visualization, could also affect an
individual’s confidence as to whether the event occurred. This would increase the
familiarity of the event in the absence of perceptual detail. Using the imagination
inflation procedure, Sharman et al. asked individuals to write an explanation about how
an event could have happened to them, rather than asking them to imagine the event.
Mean change scores showed that participants were more confident that the explained
target event(s) really occurred in their childhood compared to those that were not
explained. However, we note two concerns. As with the paraphrase condition in
Sharman, Garry, and Beuke (2004), it is unknown to what degree individuals in this study
engaged in visualization during the explanation task; thus, visualization may have played
a role. Of further note, however, is that asking an individual how an event could have
happened does not necessarily engage the individual in processing the details of the event
itself. It may instead manipulate the plausibility of the event, that is, the sense that the
event could have happened in the past, without impacting ratings that the event did in fact
occur (Scoboria et al., 2006). This point will be returned to below.
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The increases in individuals’ confidence ratings as a result of interacting with
anagrams, paraphrasing, or explaining events can potentially be accounted for by a
fluency explanation. This model maintains that exposure to an event increases its
familiarity and results in a greater confidence that the events did happen. Since engaging
with events makes them more cognitively available, individuals may misinterpret their
awareness of the events to be due to having actually experienced them. Engaging with an
event in the absence of visualization, according to this argument, is enough to inflate
confidence that the event had occurred (Sharman, Garry, & Beuke, 2004).
Visualization and engaging with an event in the absence of visualization likely
involve different cognitive processes that could influence the degree to which individuals
come to recall events. Since few studies systematically distinguish between these two
processes, it is difficult to establish which types of information individuals are using to
determine whether events could have occurred to them in the past and, subsequently,
which processes are influencing their decisions. Accordingly, this study attempts to
determine the effects of different levels of exposure to events (receiving script details
without additional engagement, describing an event in the absence of encouraged
visualization, and visualization through a guided imagery process) on event ratings using
the imagination inflation paradigm. In addition, since these processes may affect belief
and memory differently, the ABMQ will be used to distinguish how the manipulations
impact each construct respectively.
Plausibility
As alluded to above, the plausibility of events is another factor likely to affect
ratings in imagination inflation studies, as plausibility has been demonstrated to hold an
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important role in the acceptance of false autobiographical events. Pezdek et al. (1997)
conducted the first study in which the plausibility of events was manipulated in the false
memory literature. They asserted that it should be easier “to form a memory trace for an
event that is plausible and about which one has a well-developed generic script than to
form a memory for an event that is implausible and about which one does not have a
generic script” (p.437). In two studies, they presented either a plausible or an implausible
event to study participants, and demonstrated that false memories were endorsed for
plausible, but not implausible, events. Accordingly, Pezdek et al (1997) maintained that
“memories” for false events are acquired as a result of related information with which the
individual is familiar. Therefore, it should be difficult to create a false memory for an
event for which a script does not exist. Even once script information is provided for
unfamiliar events, knowledge is still restricted to that which has been provided, and it
would still be more difficult to increase plausibility and subsequent “remembering” for
these events than for a familiar and plausible event.
Though having established the importance of event plausibility in the false
memory arena, this work has been criticized for implying that the plausibility of events is
fixed. To challenge this assumption, Mazzoni et al. (2001) proposed a three-stage model
by which they maintained false memories emerge: 1) that individuals must first come to
believe that an event is plausible; then, 2) that it was in fact personally experienced; and,
finally, 3) they must experience the event as if it were a real memory. Coming to see an
event as being plausible, according to this model, may be the determining factor as to
whether an individual will entertain the notion of an event’s occurrence. In a series of
studies, Mazzoni et al. (2001) administered two manipulations, one hypothesized to
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enhance the plausibility of the event, and the other hypothesized to affect likelihood
ratings that the event actually occurred. Participants in this study were individuals who
initially claimed that they had not witnessed an unlikely event as a child (a demonic
possession). Individuals receiving the plausibility manipulation were provided with a
written article about demonic possession, which described possessions and suggested that
the frequency of possession was higher than previously believed, specifically in the
socioeconomic and cultural population to which the participants belonged. Individuals for
whom likelihood ratings were also targeted received the plausibility enhancing
information in addition to a fabricated suggestion. This suggestion was allegedly based
on an interpretation of the participant’s responses to a “fear survey”. Here, participants
were informed that their responses indicated that they likely witnessed another individual
being possessed while a child. In a final session, individuals rated the plausibility of
witnessing a possession, and they were asked to indicate whether this had happened to
them. Participants would rate how certain they were that the events had happened to them
before the age of 3 on an 8 point likert scale, ranging from 1 (certain that the event had
not happened to them) to 8 (certain the event had happened to them).
Mazzoni et al. (2001) found that individuals who received the plausibility
manipulation reported the event to be more plausible, and, when combined with the
suggestion that they had in fact witnessed the event in question, indicated greater
confidence that they had likely witnessed a possession themselves. Although it was
determined that changes in likelihood ratings were greater for an initially plausible event
(having choked on an object), likelihood ratings also increased for the implausible event,
as likelihood ratings post-manipulation were comparable. Notably, the magnitude of
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change in likelihood ratings was consistent with the magnitude of change noted in the
imagination inflation studies previously discussed (e.g., Garry et al., 1996; Mazzoni &
Loftus, 1998; Pezdek et al, 1997). Thus it may be that “perceived plausibility merely
needs to be boosted beyond a relatively low threshold in order for a personalized
manipulation (e.g., the fear profile feedback) to produce changes in likelihood ratings”
(Mazzoni et al, 2001, p.54). However, the information used to boost plausibility must be
personally relevant to the participant, as it was further demonstrated that this effect was
largely eliminated when the information was about individuals perceived to be from a
different cultural group (Mazzoni et al, 2001, Study 3).
Further work has since refined the impact of different types of plausibilityenhancing information. Hart and Schooler (2006) attempted to distinguish between
knowledge of script information and plausibility in a series of studies by looking at their
effects on confidence levels for a fabricated childhood event. In their first experiment,
participants received either false information regarding the plausibility of an event, script
information, a combination of these factors, or no manipulation. It was determined that
when participants read information about the plausibility of having experienced the event
as a child, their confidence levels increased. In contrast, schematic information “had no
influence on their beliefs about whether they had experienced this procedure” (p. 664). In
a second experiment, Hart and Schooler added a memory component, asking participants
how well they remembered the event. Results from this study replicated the effect of the
plausibility narrative on confidence ratings; however the passage did not affect their
memory for the event. Accordingly, participants were not relying on a specific memory
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when determining whether they experienced the event but “rather on more general
considerations regarding the likelihood that the event might have taken place” (p.667).
This procedure was later refined by Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, and Jimenez
(2006) using the ABMQ. In this study, participants were given articles that provided
either fabricated prevalence or script-relevant information. The prevalence information
consisted of a rationale as to why the procedure was a common medical screening for
children at the time in which the participants would have been children, and the script
information provided individuals with information regarding how the event typically
occurs. The presentation of prevalence information appeared to substantially impact
general and personal plausibility ratings, and possibly belief ratings to a lesser degree.
Conversely, the only effect of script-related information was an increase in general
knowledge for both events, and a slight increase in general plausibility.
Thus providing external influences (e.g., prevalence information) to persuade
individuals that an event likely occurred to them has been shown to affect likelihood
ratings. Other studies suggest that people become more convinced that an event likely
happened to them as a result of explanations that they generate themselves (Koehler,
1991; Garry et al., 1996). Past research has shown that explaining future outcomes affects
likelihood judgments for those proceedings. Individuals have become more confident
about a patient’s diagnosis after explaining why it could be true (Ross, Lepper, Strack, &
Steinmetz, 1977), while others have become more confident in asserting who would win
an election after imagining the success of one of the candidates (Carroll, 1978). Thus,
considering the possibility that something may be true appears sufficient to make a
phenomena appear more factual. It has been hypothesized that explaining past events has
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the same effect (Garry et al., 1996; Sharman, Manning, & Garry, 2005). In generating a
reason for both how an event might happen or how an event could have occurred,
individuals must temporarily proceed as if their alternate reason were factual. Creating a
hypothetical event forces individuals to fit a conceptualization of the event into their
“more general knowledge about the world”, which makes the hypothetical event seem
more likely than it did before the task (Koehler, 1991, p.506). Koehler (1991) asserted
that the details that participants produce in explaining a potential outcome, accordingly,
are remembered better than other possibilities.
Therefore, it appears that either externally presented information or internally
generated explanations about events either directly or indirectly influence likelihood
ratings for past events. Thus, enhancing the plausibility of events appears to be a potential
mechanism by which belief in the occurrence of events is enhanced. However, believing
that an event occurred in the past is not the same as remembering the event and thus
further processes are necessary to produce a false memory for an event.
Limitations
Of note are two criticisms that have been directed at research on imagination
inflation. One criticism put forth by Pezdek and Eddy (2001) is that imagination inflation
is a “spurious effect caused by regression to the mean” (Garry et al., 2001, p. 719).
Although there is some validity to this argument, as this is likely shifting low scores
upwards in both conditions, this does not imply that the findings in these studies are
statistical artifacts. Regression to the mean would not account for additional inflation in
imagined events as compared with control events. As well, imagination inflation studies
have been criticized in that the effects are small, and thus insufficient to explain
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formation of entire false autobiographical memories. However, although the changes are
small, they are consistent (Garry et al., 2001). Furthermore, Garry et al. (2001)
demonstrated that when paired t-tests were run for events that were and were not
imagined, the effect size was not small but, rather, impressive, d = 1.26.
Present Study
The present study was designed to systematically investigate the influence of both
plausibility enhancing information and various levels of exposure to script information
upon changes in likelihood ratings, plausiblity, autobiographical belief, and memory
ratings for unlikely childhood events. Participants were assigned to varying levels of
exposure to the event, including mere exposure to the event script, describing the event
without encouraged visualization, or engaging in visualization through guided imagery.
Participants were additionally assigned to either receive the plausibility manipulation
(reading prevalence information, which indicated that they likely experienced the event)
or they were not provided with this information.
Hypotheses
The following predictions were made (graphically depicted in Figure 1), based
upon the previously reviewed theoretical perspectives and empirical findings:
Hypothesis 1: Life Events Inventory (confidence ratings). Scores on this measure
were expected to replicate standard imagination inflation findings. That is, it was
expected that change scores on likelihood ratings would be greater for events that have
been imagined than those that have not been imagined. The purpose was to replicate
previous findings prior to extending the results by distinguishing between plausibility,
belief, and memory.
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Hypothesis 2; General and personal plausiblity. This study was not designed to
distinguish between these constructs, as prior work has shown prevalence information to
impact both. Thus, it was expected that reading information about the prevalence of
events would lead to a substantial change on both measures. Additionally, it was
hypothesized that exposure to the target event through the description and visualization
conditions was likely to impact plausibility ratings as a result of increased familiarity
with the event, although to a lesser extent.
Hypothesis 3: Autobiographical belief. It was hypothesized that this is where the
standard imagination inflation effects would most likely occur. It was predicted that the
plausibility manipulation would likely affect individuals’ levels of perceived personal
plausibility. As a result of increased personal investment, it was thought that individuals
would misinterpret this as belief, which would lead to a small degree of change in belief
ratings. It was further expected that when individuals would engage more fully in the
event after the plausibility manipulation, through either description or visualization, that
the enhanced plausibility would interact with the information about the event, causing an
increase in belief. This effect was predicted to be the greatest after visualizing the event.
Hypothesis 4: Memory ratings. The strongest test of the role of these
manipulations upon the theoretical distinction between autobiographical belief and
memory for an event arises in predicting at what point increases in memory ratings are
expected to emerge. It was predicted that only when the enhancement of autobiographical
belief via the plausibility manipulation is followed by the generation of vivid imagery in
the guided imagery group would memory ratings increase. Thus, an interaction between
plausibility enhancement and exposure to event was predicted.
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Hypothesis 5: The Nested Model. It was predicted that the ratings provided by
individuals on the various constructs would provide further evidence for the nested
model, which posits that ratings for general plausibility would be greater than or equal to
those for personal plausibility, which would be greater than or equal to those of belief,
which, in turn, would be greater than or equal to ratings for memory.
Crossing the two factors of interest (type of exposure to script: exposure,
description, guided visualization; and plausibility enhancement: absent, present) results in
six experimental groups, to which individuals were randomly assigned. The Life Events
Inventory (LEI) and the Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ)
were administered upon signing up for the study. Participants responded to these
measures in regard to a series of 10 events commonly used in the false memory literature.
These ratings constitute the Time 1 data.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two target events that have
previously been used in the literature. These events were selected as they are extremely
unlikely to have occurred during the childhood of the participant population. All
individuals read two narratives, one being that of their assigned target event. After
completing each narrative, individuals were asked to answer questions about how well
the event was described. Individuals who completed just these measures constitute the
control condition. Participants in a second and third condition were asked to additionally
describe the event procedurally, using themselves in their description, or to engage in a
guided imagery procedure in which they visualized the event procedurally using
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themselves in their visualization. Although individuals in the description group may have
also engaged in some visualization, the guided imagery procedure was expected to
augment the amount of visualization experienced as it is actively produced in detail, thus
distinguishing between incidental visualization and the amount of visualization that
occurs when encouraged. These procedures are analogous to those used in various
imagination inflation studies; however, here the elements were separated in an attempt to
disambiguate mere exposure from discussing the event and the act of visualization.
The three conditions comprising the exposure factor were crossed with a
plausibility factor (presenting or not presenting prevalence information). This was
expected to facilitate the effects that both description and visualization have upon
memory. The additional prevalence information was included at the end of the narratives
for individuals assigned to receive the plausibility enhancing information.
After completing the manipulations, individuals were told that the lab was
collecting test-retest data on the measures that they initially completed, and they were
asked to complete the LEI and the ABMQ again; these responses constitute the Time 2
data. Changes in scores between Time 1 and Time 2 on the LEI and ABMQ would
comprise the main analyses.
This study was designed to lead to a greater understanding of the effects found in
the imagination inflation paradigm. This is crucial as procedures similar to those under
study are frequently implemented in both legal and mental health settings. For example,
suspects may be asked to repeatedly visualize or describe an event they do not remember,
and mental health professionals may encourage clients to imagine unremembered past
abusive events (Garry et al., 1996). If the procedures under study do impact individuals’
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perceptions of the past, it is important to know what factors specifically result in these
distortions, as well as what aspects of “memory” these practices actually impact (e.g., the
extent to which they believe or remember events occurring).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

22

Chapter II
METHOD
Participants
Participant Numbers and Characteristics
The sample consisted of 133 undergraduate Psychology students recniited from the
Participant Pool at the University of Windsor; participants received course credit through
the Department of Psychology if taking a course for which such credit was offered. All
participants were between the ages of 17 and 21 years (M = 19.25, SD = .98) at the time
of testing and they all maintained that they lived in Ontario between the ages of 3 and 5
years, which ensured that the false prevalence information was relevant to them. Twentyseven participants (20%) were male (Mean age = 19.33, SD = 1.44), while 103
participants were female (Mean age = 19.23, SD = .95). All sessions were recorded and
reviewed to ensure accuracy in the administration of the procedure. Participants were
treated in accordance with both the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the “Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct” (American Psychological Association,
1992), and approval for the study was provided by the University of Windsor Research
Ethics Board.
Although a sample of 180 participants was desired, there were several difficulties in
attaining this group. This was partially due to the limitations of who could participate and
the number of participants in the participant pool who met these restrictions. Further, due
to the nature of the study, individuals who had completed comparable studies at the
university did not qualify to participate in the present study. Of the 182 who registered to
for the study, 28 participants did not come to the testing session. Out of the remaining
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154 participants who completed the procedure, 12 were removed from the sample as they
did not fall into the required age range, 5 participants did not have a long enough time
interval between their baseline measures and those completed post manipulation (a
minimum of 10 days), and an additional 4 were removed from the sample as there was an
error in the administration of the procedure during testing. Additionally, certain data
points were removed (see below) within the remaining participants due to responses that
were greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean. The remaining number of
participants per cell by target event is listed in Appendix A.

Measures and Apparatus
Life Events Inventory (LEI; Garry et al., 1996)
This measure asks participants to rate how certain they are that a list of events
happened to them or did not happen to them before the age of 6. Individuals responded
regarding 10 events that have been used in previous research (e.g., Garry et al., 1996;
Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Sharman et al., 2005): (1) losing a toy as a child, (2) seeing or
hearing a real ghost, (3) having a tooth extracted by a dentist, (4) having a skin sample
taken by a school nurse, (5) choking on a small object, (6) receiving a bone density
screening, (7) receiving a rectal enema, (8) breaking a window with their hand, (9)
getting lost in a shopping mall, and (10) calling 911.
Participants responded to each item by circling the appropriate response on an 8point Likert scale, ranging from (1) definitely did not happen, to (8) definitely did
happen (Appendix B). It should be noted that the Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory
Questionnaire (described below) is an elaboration of this measure, and the LEI and
ABMQ Belief item are thought to conceptually assess the same construct (likelihood of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation

24

occurrence, independent of memory; Scoboria et al, 2004). The LEI was included,
however, to replicate past research and allow for comparisons to be made with previous
findings.
Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ; Scoboria et al., 2004)
This measure was developed to capture a number of theoretically distinct aspects
of the remembering process. This measure assesses general plausibility, personal
plausibility, autobiographical belief, and autobiographical memory (Appendix C).
General plausibility questions how plausible it is that at least some people experience the
event in question (e.g., how plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6,
lose a toy?). Personal plausibility inquires as to how plausible it is that the participant,
personally, experienced the event (e.g., how plausible is it that you personally, before the
age of 6, could have lost a toy?). Autobiographical belief asks how likely it is that they
did in fact experience the event (e.g., how likely is it that you personally, before the age
of 6, did in fact lose a toy?). Finally, autobiographical memory inquires as to whether
individuals actually remember experiencing the event (e.g., do you actually remember
losing a toy before you were the age of 6?). All of the questions in the ABMQ ask
individuals to judge each construct as related to others (general plausibility) or
themselves (personal plausibility, belief, and memory) prior to the age of 6 years. Each of
these items were rated on a 1- to 8-point Likert scale, anchored ‘Not at all plausible’ and
‘Extremely plausible’ for General Plausibility and Personal Plausibility; ‘Definitely did
not happen’ and ‘Definitely happened’ for Belief; and ‘No memory for event at all’ and
‘Clear and complete memory for event’ for Memory. The same events that were
included in the LEI were used in this measure.
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Target Events
The items “having a skin sample taken by a school nurse” and “receiving a bone
density screening” were used as the target events in the present study. Participants were
randomly assigned to receive additional information about one of these two events. The
experimental manipulations involved these events, and responses for these items were
used to assess changes in ratings that occurred between testing sessions. These events
have been used in previous research, and they were selected because they are extremely
unlikely to have occurred during the childhood of the participant population. These
events were placed as the 4th and 6th events of the 10 events on both the LEI and ABMQ
and were counterbalanced between these two positions to control for order of
presentation. An additional narrative on diabetes was included to reaffirm the cover story
as presented to the participants. However, the target event was always presented as the
first event.
Script Information
Basic script information was provided to participants for their assigned target event
(Appendix D). The purpose of these narratives was to provide a brief description of the
target event to ensure that the participants had a basic familiarity with the event, as
individuals appear to require some script knowledge to appropriately evaluate events
(Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Hart & Schooler, in press). Previous research has shown
that script information impacts general plausibility but not personal plausibility ratings;
thus, these passages were not expected to impact the predictions asserted in the current
study (Scoboria et al., 2004). Script information for both events was comparable in
content and length. The script for “receiving a bone density screening” was comprised of
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information regarding the Dual Energy X-Ray Absorpitometry (DEXA) Screening. This
script was adapted from previous published (Scoboria et al, 2006) and unpublished work
conducted at the University of Windsor under the supervision of Dr. Alan Scoboria.
Script information for “having a skin sample taken by a school nurse” included
information regarding the Papilloma Virus Screening and was adapted for this study by
the experimenter. Both narratives provided basic information regarding the screenings,
including procedural information. The length of the script information for the DEXA and
Papilloma Virus Screenings were 217 and 211 words respectively, and the details
provided in the scripts were comparable with one another (e.g., dates, medical facts,
details of procedure). An additional Diabetes medical narrative (adopted from Hart &
Schooler, 2006) was also administered to every individual to reinforce the cover story
that the study was evaluating medical narratives (Appendix E). This narrative is a
personal account of a family who learned that their daughter had diabetes.
Prevalence Information
This is an addition to the medical narratives and was placed following the script
information for those assigned to receive the plausibility manipulation. These passages
were 391 and 363 words in length for the DEXA Screenings and Papilloma Screenings
respectively (Appendix D), and they indicated that the target event was common in the
participant’s geographical area when the participant was approximately 3-5 years of age.
For each target event, information was provided explaining why the event was a common
procedure at this time and includes fabricated statistics supporting the occurrence of the
event, as “documented” by medical associations.
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Filler Task
In order to control for time, individuals were told that they would be asked to
perform various tasks that required attentional control. This consisted of a perceptual task
whereby individuals had to locate the Waldo character from the "Where's Waldo"
published series as many times as they could in a set time frame (Handford, 2006). This
was meant to engage the individual and prevent them from further processing the
previously addressed material.
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the University of Windsor Research Ethics
Board.
The study was administered in two phases. Individuals first completed various
measures and demographic information online. Participants then came into the lab
between 10 and 16 days later for the experimental manipulation.
Phase 1
Participants first accessed the study website and, after providing their consent
(Appendix F), completed demographic information including their name, age, gender,
ethnic background, country of birth, and whether they lived in Ontario between the ages
of 3 and 5 years. Participants then completed the Life Events Inventory (LEI) and the
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire. At this point, participants selected a
day and time to come into the lab for the next component of the study.
Phase 2
Participants came to the lab, at which point it was explained that the researchers
were interested in the relationship between perceptions of medical narratives and
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performance on various attention exercises.
Conditions
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: control, description,
visualization, prevalence, prevalence with description, or prevalence with visualization.
These conditions are defined below.
Control
Individuals in this condition first read the narrative regarding their target event.
This narrative was comprised solely of basic script information. After completing the
narrative, individuals were asked to answer questions about how well the event was
written. After completing the ratings, participants were exposed to the filler task.
Participants then received the Diabetes narrative after which they subsequently completed
questions regarding how well the event was written. At this time participants, again, were
exposed to the filler task.
Description
In addition to the measures administered to the control group, participants in this
condition were asked to describe the procedure of the target event after completing the
first set of ratings, prior to the filler task. They were asked to focus on how the event
would typically occur, where it would typically occur, and who would be present. They
were further asked to use themselves in their description of the event as if they were the
individual undergoing the procedure when they were a child. After this, participants read
the second medical narrative and answered the subsequent questions about how well the
event was written.
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Visualization
This condition consisted of the same procedure as the Description condition,
however, rather than asking individuals to describe the event, this condition asked
participants to visualize the target event through a guided imagery procedure. The
individual was asked to close their eyes (to help them to create a visual representation)
and imagine how the target event occurs procedurally, using themselves when they were
a child as the individual undergoing the procedure. Individuals were guided to visualize
the location, the individuals present, what was happening, and how it felt to be there.
Participants were asked to relay this information verbally.
Prevalence
Individuals in this condition first read the narrative regarding their target event.
In addition to basic script information for their target event, false prevalence information
was included in the narrative indicating that the event was common in the participant’s
geographical area when the participant was younger. Individuals were then asked to
answer questions about how well the event was written. After, participants were exposed
to the filler task. Participants then received the Diabetes narrative to which they,
subsequently, completed questions regarding how well the event was written. At this
time participants, again, were exposed to the filler task.
Prevalence and Description
This procedure includes the same manipulation as that in the Prevalence
condition. However, prior to engaging in the filler task participants engaged in the
Description task (found above).
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Prevalence and Visualization
This procedure includes the same manipulation as that in the Prevalence
condition. However, prior to engaging in the filler task, participants engaged in the
Visualization task.
In all conditions, after completing the procedures included in their assigned
condition, individuals were told that the lab was collecting test-retest data on the
measures that they previously completed, and they were asked to complete these
measures again. These responses constitute Time 2 data post manipulation.
Participants then underwent a debriefing process. They were queried as to their
perception of the intent of the study, after which they were debriefed. In the debriefing, it
was emphasized that the study was in fact about childhood memory and that the
prevalence paragraph was comprised of false information. At this point the nature of
memory and memory falsification was also explained and normalized.
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Chapter III
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
Descriptive statistics for the LEI and the four ABMQ variables (general
plausibility, GP; personal plausibility, PP; autobiographical belief, BE; autobiographical
memory, ME) were assessed at baseline for the target events. Mean scores and standard
deviations for these initial measures are reported in Table 1. Individuals who reported a
memory of either target event (defined as a baseline rating greater than four) were
excluded prior to analysis. This was done to ensure that individuals did not initially
endorse the event, as this could evoke a different set of processes during the post
manipulation ratings; the focus of the current study was to determine the influence of the
various factors in the absence of memory. Additionally, outliers exceeding 3 standard
deviations from the mean were identified. Of 1330 total responses, 15 (1.13 percent) were
identified as being greater than three standard deviations above the mean and were
removed from the data.
Target events at baseline were compared using paired samples t-tests. The events
differed significantly for general plausibility, t (131) = -2.949, p < .05, with bone density
receiving significantly higher scores than skin sample. The events did not differ
significantly for personal plausibility, autobiographical belief, memory, or on the ratings
of the Life Events Inventory (all p > .05). Further, a series of 2x3 between subjects
ANOVAs (prevalence by exposure) were conducted to evaluate whether groups were
equivalent at baseline. These revealed that the randomization was successful, as there
were no significant differences between the different groups prior to manipulation
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Table 1
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations o f all Individuals Tested at Baseline

No Prevalence

Exposure

Prevalence

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample

Mean

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

Bone
Density

SD

Mean

SD

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

4.56

2.19

5.08

2.43

5.18

2.18

5.60

2.12

Description

4.92

2.88

5.82

1.83

5.00

1.68

4.80

2.04

Visualization

5.54

1.81

5.70

1.89

5.36

2.06

5.78

1.99

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

3.11

2.61

3.00

2.35

3.36

2.29

2.90

1.85

Description

2.67

2.10

3.55

2.54

2.92

1.75

3.70

2.36

Visualization

4.23

1.91

3.00

2.58

2.45

1.69

3.30

1.70

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

1.89

1.69

2.08

1.85

3.09

2.39

1.20

0.42

Description

1.50

0.91

1.55

0.69

2.08

1.04

2.00

0.94

Visualization

2.15

1.21

1.90

1.45

1.55

1.21

2.30

1.57

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

1.33

1.00

1.00

0.00

1.09

0.30

1.00

0.00

Description

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.15

0.56

1.00

0.00

Visualization

1.08

0.28

1.20

0.42

1.00

0.00

1.20

0.42

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

1.89

1.61

2.08

1.75

1.82

1.40

1.30

0.68

Description

2.00

1.28

1.27

0.47

1.85

1.21

1.60

0.69

Visualization

1.38

0.65

1.50

0.71

2.00

2.09

1.40

0.69
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(all p >.10). A series of ANCOVAs were run to determine whether age or gender
impacted responding; no significant results were found for any of the variables (p > .10).
Prior to conducting the analysis, data was screened to ensure that no assumptions
would be violated in order to ensure the validity of the results. Univariate normality was
assessed to determine whether the analysis was skewed. Of 650 total change scores on
the target events, 15 (2.31 percent) were identified as being greater than 3 standard
deviations above the mean. To determine whether these variables were influential,
scatterplots were run on combinations of the independent variables. Since the scatterplots
were not all elliptical, the assumption was not robust to this violation, and the outliers
were removed from the dataset.
The assumption of Homogeneity of Variance was assessed using Levene’s
statistic. Significant results were found for general plausibility, belief, and memory, (p <
.05), indicating that the groups did not have equal variances. The ANOVA statistic,
nevertheless, is relatively robust to the failure of this assumption, particularly when
groups are of equal sample size. Accordingly, since the difference between the largest
sample size and the smallest sample size did not exceed 1.5, it was assumed that the
failure to meet this assumption would not significantly affect the results.
Mean baseline scores and standard deviations for the adjusted sample are located
in Table 2.
Analysis o f Change Scores
To test the primary hypotheses, mean change scores for each variable were
analyzed using 2x3 between subjects ANOVAs (prevalence by exposure) and 2x3
between subjects ANCOVAs (controlling for baseline scores). This was done to examine
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Table 2
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations fo r Adjusted Sample at Baseline

Prevalence

No Prevalence

Exposure

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample

Mean

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

Bone
Density

SD

Mean

SD

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

4.37

2.26

5.08

2.43

5.18

2.18

5.60

2.12

Description

4.92

2.88

5.82

1.83

5.00

1.68

4.80

2.04

Visualization

5.54

1.81

5.70

1.89

5.36

2.06

5.78

1.99

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

2.75

2.55

3.00

2.35

3.36

2.29

2.90

1.85

Description

2.67

2.10

3.55

2.54

2.92

1.75

3.70

2.36

Visualization

4.23

1.92

3.00

2.58

2.46

1.69

3.30

1.70

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

1.38

0.74

2.08

1.85

2.11

1.05

1.20

0.42

Description

1.50

0.91

1.55

0.69

2.08

1.04

2.00

0.94

Visualization

2.15

1.21

1.90

1.45

1.55

1.21

2.30

1.57

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.09

0.30

1.00

0.00

Description

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

Visualization

1.08

0.28

1.11

0.33

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

1.38

0.52

1.75

1.36

1.82

1.40

1.30

0.68

Description

2.00

1.28

1.27

0.47

1.85

1.21

1.60

0.69

Visualization

1.38

0.65

1.50

0.71

1.40

0.69

1.40

0.69
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the main effects and interactions of the variables while determining whether any
differences at baseline confounded the results post-manipulation. Results of these
analyses can be found in Appendix G. Differences were found for general plausibility, as
the prevalence main effect shifted from being marginally significant (F = 3.86, p = .052)
to significant (F = 4.29, p = .040), and the prevalence interaction moved closer to
significance (F = 1.75, p = .178; vs. F = 2.92, p = .058). As a result of the discrepancies
between these two measures, the covariate was included in the analysis for general
plausibility to account for some of the variance in the dependent variable, thus increasing
the statistical power and reducing experimental error. No differences were found when
controlling for baseline scores on any other variable. Since including the covariate
reduces the degrees of freedom and can reduce power if the covariate accounts for little
variance, the ANOVA was employed for the remaining variables. Mean change scores
and standard deviations can be found in Table 3. No differences were found for target
event, and, accordingly, the events were pooled together for subsequent analyses (for a
graphical depiction of the effects of the variables, refer to Appendix I).
A series of variables, including age, gender, and days between administration of
the measures, were further examined; none of these variables significantly impacted the
pattern of results. Significant scores were considered those less than p = .05, although
trends less than or equal to p = .11 were also evaluated due to low statistical power.
Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d, by dividing the difference between group
means by their pooled standard deviation.
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Table 3
Mean Change Scores and Standard Deviations fo r Adjusted Sample

No Prevalence

Exposure

Prevalence

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample

Mean

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

Bone
Density

SD

Mean

SD

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

-0.88

1.46

-0.33

1.23

1.09

1.92

0.50

1.90

Description

-0.55

2.02

0.45

1.75

0.46

1.56

-0.22

1.20

Visualization

-0.08

0.76

0.00

1.16

0.64

1.75

-0.56

2.60

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

-0.38

1.41

-0.17

1.03

0.55

1.97

-0.20

0.42

Description

0.36

1.57

0.36

2.20

0.54

1.13

0.30

1.16

Visualization

-0.62

1.95

0.10

0.74

0.91

1.38

1.30

2.21

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

0.00

0.54

-0.42

0.79

0.10

1.19

0.60

0.84

Description

0.25

0.62

-0.27

0.47

-0.15

1.28

-0.25

1.49

Visualization

-0.38

1.19

-0.30

1.42

0.18

0.60

-0.78

1.56

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Description

0.08

0.29

0.00

0.00

0.09

0.30

0.00

0.00

Visualization

-0.38

1.19

-0.30

1.42

0.18

0.60

-0.78

1.56

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

0.13

0.35

0.00

0.63

0.27

0.65

0.10

0.88

Description

0.27

1.10

-0.18

0.41

0.38

0.96

0.30

1.06

Visualization

0.08

0.79

-0.10

-0.99

0.50

1.08

-0.20

0.42

Note: baseline scores were included as a covariate in the analyses for general plausibility
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Hypothesis 1
It was hypothesized that scores on the Life Events Inventory would replicate
standard imagination inflation findings. No support was found for this prediction, as the
ANOVA indicated that change scores did not differ significantly between any of the
experimental groups (all p > .05).
Hypothesis 2
Second, it was predicted that the plausibility manipulation would lead to a
substantial change in general and personal plausibility ratings. This hypothesis was
supported, as analyses of both general and personal plausibility revealed a main effect for
prevalence information, F (1, 125) = 3.96, p < .05, d = .34 and F (1, 124) = 5.70, p < .05,
d = .41 respectively. The mean of the prevalence groups was at the 56th percentile of
those who were not given the prevalence information for general plausibility, while the
j

mean of the prevalence groups was at the 63 percentile of those who were not given the
prevalence information for personal plausibility. When collapsing across levels of
exposure, examination of group means revealed that prevalence increased scores for both
general plausibility (No Prevalence: M = -.20, SD = 1.44 vs. Prevalence: M = .37, SD =
1.85) and personal plausibility (No Prevalence: M = -.06, SD = 1.57 vs. Prevalence: M =
.57, SD = 1.50).
Although the study was not meant to distinguish between the plausibility
constructs, one primary difference did arise. Although the prevalence by exposure
interaction did approach significance for both general plausibility, F (2, 122) = 2.921, p =
.058, and personal plausibility, F (2, 124) = 2.247, p = .110, the nature of this trend
varied between the two variables. Whereas for general plausibility the plausibility
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manipulation significantly impacted scores only in the control condition (with and
without the plausibility manipulation), t (39) = 2.69, p < .05, for personal plausibility the
plausibility manipulation significantly impacted only the visualization groups, t (42) = 2.77, p < .01 (see Figures 2 and 3). Although the other variables were not significantly
impacted by the provision of prevalence information, providing individuals with
prevalence information did elevate the mean scores numerically on all variables post
manipulation.
For general plausibility, the no prevalence conditions did result in progressively
higher ratings for description and visualization, indicating that exposure impacted
responses, although not significantly. For the prevalence conditions, the provision of the
prevalence information alone did significantly impact ratings (control M = .81, SD =
1.89). When combined with either the description or visualization manipulation,
however, there was little impact on general plausibility ratings (description M = .18, SD =
1.44; visualization M = .10, SD = 2.19).
For personal plausibility, although none of the manipulations elevated
participants’ ratings in the absence of prevalence information, (control M = -.25, SD =
1.16; description M = .36, SD = 1.86; visualization M = -.30, SD = 1.55), they did
increase with greater exposure for those provided with the plausibility manipulation
(control M = .19, SD = 1.47; description M = .43, SD =1.12; visualization M = 1.10, SD
= 1.79). Although the increase across exposure did not reach significance, a trend did
emerge between the control and visualization groups, with ratings on visualization
trending towards being statistically greater than those given for the control condition, t
(40) = -1.80/7 = .079.
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Effect o f Prevalence across Levels o f Exposure fo r General Plausibility

1.5

1

0.5
Prevalence
No Prevalence

o

-

0.5

■1

Control

Describe

Visualize

Condition

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Imagination Inflation
Figure 3
Effect o f Prevalence across Levels o f Exposure fo r Personal Plausibility
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Hypothesis 3
It was further hypothesized that providing prevalence information would increase
individuals’ personal investment and might lead them to misinterpret this as belief.
Moreover, it was predicted that when this manipulation was combined with higher levels
of exposure there would be a more substantial increase in belief. There was no support
for either prediction, as the analysis of variance revealed no significant differences on
belief ratings between groups (all p > .10).
Hypothesis 4
Additionally, it was predicted that there would be an interaction between
prevalence information and visualization, as it was thought that only when the prevalence
information was followed by visualization would memory ratings increase. Again, no
support was found for this prediction, as the analysis of variance revealed no significant
differences between groups (all p > .10).
Analysis o f Change Proportions
The proportion of participants whose ratings increased on the LEI and each
ABMQ variable were analyzed using the logistic regression statistic. This is a more
conservative analytic approach, which examines the proportion of individuals increasing
in score, independent of the degree of change. This was done as previous studies have
used this statistic to ensure that the results were not unduly influenced by large amounts
of pre- post change in a small number of participants. Proportions of participants
increasing can be found in Table 4. It should be noted, however, that although this looks
at the individuals whose scores increased, it does not account for proportions of
individuals who decreased in their ratings. Accordingly, change scores, as determined
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Table 4
Proportion Increasing fo r Adjusted Sample

No Prevalence

Exposure

Prevalence

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

.25

.08

.64

.30

Description

.17

.55

.31

.20

Visualization

.23

.30

.45

.40

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

.13

.31

.45

.00

Description

.33

.45

.46

.30

Visualization

.15

.10

.55

.60

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

.13

.00

.36

.40

Description

.33

.00

.23

.10

Visualization

.23

.20

.27

.20

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

.00

.00

.00

.00

Description

.08

.00

.08

.00

Visualization

.00

.00

.00

.00

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

.13

.15

.18

.20

Description

.33

.00

.38

.20

Visualization

.31

.10

.36

.00
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by the analysis of variance and covariance, provide a more clear illustration of the effects.
To understand and predict the effects of the variables on whether individuals’
ratings increase post-manipulation, participants whose scores did not increase were coded
as a 0, whereas individuals whose ratings did increase were coded as a 1. To analyze
these scores, logistic regression analyses were conducted by entering the main effects for
prevalence (present, absent) and exposure (none, description, visualization), and their
interactions. Each factor was coded as categorical, producing overall interaction effects,
and interaction contrasts (control vs. description and control vs. visualization). When
interaction contrasts were found to be statistically significant, they were further explored
using Chi Square tests.
For general plausibility, logistic regression revealed that there was a significant
interaction between prevalence and exposure when contrasting the control group with the
description group (B = -2.11, SE = .99, Wald = 4.46, p < .05). Although the provision of
prevalence information increased the odds that the respondents would increase their
ratings in comparison to those who were not given the prevalence information for the
control and visualization groups, the provision of prevalence information decreased the
odds that the ratings would increase for those in the description group. To further explore
this interaction, a series of Chi Square tests were conducted. These analyses indicated
that there were no significant differences between receiving prevalence information or
not for the description and visualization groups. However, an association between
providing prevalence information and whether individuals’ scores increased post
manipulation was identified for the control group, x2 (1) = 5.46, p < .05. This reflects the
fact that 77% of the individuals whose scores increased post-manipulation in the control
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group were those who were provided with prevalence information. Overall, about 24% of
individuals who responded in the control group increased when provided with prevalence
information in comparison to approximately 7% of individuals who were not provided
with prevalence information.
Turning to personal plausibility, while there were no differences in proportions of
individuals who increased in their responding for personal plausibility for the control or
description groups, a significant interaction emerged between prevalence and exposure
when contrasting the control group with the visualization group (B = 2.19, SE = 1.05,
Wald = 4.33, p < .05). Chi Square tests revealed that the use of prevalence information
had a significant effect on whether individuals' ratings increased when completing the
post manipulation measures for individuals in the visualization group, x (1) = 9.50, p <
.01. This reflects the fact that 80% of the individuals whose scores increased post
manipulation in the visualization group were those who were provided with prevalence
information. Overall, ratings for about 27% of individuals who responded in this group
increased when provided with prevalence information in comparison to approximately
7% of individuals who were not provided with prevalence information.
For belief, logistic regression revealed trends towards interactions between
prevalence and exposure when contrasting the control group with the description group
(B = -2.51, SE = 1.36, Wald = 3.39, p = .06) and with the visualization group (B = -2.39,
SE = 1.33, Wald = 3.23, p = .07). The provision of prevalence information did not impact
ratings post-manipulation for individuals in the description group, and they increased
minimally for the visualization group with about 2% more individuals increasing for
those given the prevalence information than for those not provided with this information.
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Chi Square tests generated significant results for the control condition, indicating that
there is an association between providing prevalence information and whether
individuals’ scores increased post manipulation, %2 (1) = 6.93, p < .01. This reflects the
fact that 89% of the individuals whose scores increased post-manipulation in the control
group were those who were provided with prevalence information. Overall, ratings for
about 38% of individuals who responded in the control group increased when provided
with prevalence information in comparison to approximately 5% of individuals who were
not provided with prevalence information. However, as 2 of the expected cell frequencies
(50%) were less than 5, the test may not be as precise as would be hoped.
No significant differences amongst groups were found for memory or for the
ratings on the Life Events Inventory.
Hypothesis 5
The final hypothesis was that the ratings provided by individuals on the various
constructs would provide further evidence for the nested model,which posits that GP >
PP > BE > ME. Mean responses to the ABMQ variables for target events were examined
at baseline and post-manipulation. The theoretical assumptions were upheld both at
baseline (GP: M

=

5 . 27 , SD = 2 .06 ; PP: M

=

3 . 17, SD = 2 . 11; BE: M = 1. 81 , SD = 1. 17;

ME: M = 1.02 , SD = 0 . 15) and post-manipulation (GP: M = 5 .44 , SD = 2 .05 ; PP: M =
3 .46 , SD

=

2 . 30 ; BE: M = 1. 72 , SD

=

1.01 ; ME: M - 1.03 , SD = 0 . 18).
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Chapter IV
DISCUSSION
Review o f Purpose and Hypotheses
Review o f Primary Research Questions
The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of various levels of
exposure to false childhood events and prevalence information both independently and
additively on perceptions of autobiographical events. This study was designed to
determine more specifically what is driving the effects found in the imagination inflation
literature. Further through using the ABMQ, the study was aimed to help determine what
aspects of remembering (event plausibility, autobiographical belief, and memory) are
being impacted by different elements of this paradigm. Since the necessary number of
subjects was not collected, thus reducing the power of the statistical tests, marginal
effects were also considered in the analyses and interpretations.
Hypothesis 1
It was hypothesized that confidence ratings on the LEI would be greater for
events that had been imagined than those that had not been imagined. This measure was
included to replicate previous findings. However, no significant differences were found
for either target event across the different exposure or prevalence conditions. Despite this
finding, the means were in the correct direction for an effect of prevalence upon the LEI.
Although there were systematic differences between the current study and those
previously conducted, as will be discussed below, these differences appear insufficient to
explain the lack of significant findings with the LEI. Moreover, studies that have only
implemented a plausibility manipulation in the absence of any imagery or exposure have
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also found differences in change scores on this measure (e.g., Hart & Schooler, 2006).
This is a source of confusion as the LEI did not produce effects in the current study
despite the fact that more than one condition was comparable to those that did produce
significant results in prior studies.
One essential difference between the aforementioned studies and the current
design is the inclusion of the ABMQ. Previous studies have relied on the LEI as an allencompassing measure to rate individuals’ confidence in having experienced past events.
Since the LEI does not differentiate between event plausibility, autobiographical belief,
or memory, but rather fuses them into a single confidence rating, it is difficult to know
which of these constructs influenced the confidence measure and, accordingly, what their
ratings were indicating in previous designs. The wording of the LEI, however, is
comparable to the wording used to evaluate the construct of belief as measured by the
ABMQ. When completing the baseline measures within this study, participants likely
became familiar with the different constructs that they were being asked to address when
evaluating their perceived past experiences. Accordingly, when completing the LEI,
participants may not have perceived the question as a measure of confidence, but as an
additional measure of belief. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the ratings
on the LEI both at baseline and post-manipulation are comparable to those of belief.
According to this argument, LEI based ratings are likely best to be interpreted as
reflecting belief, as discussed below. Alternatively, the LEI has been argued to confound
plausibility, belief, and memory ratings. Thus, making each construct explicit to raters at
baseline may have undermined the ability of the LEI to detect changes. Nevertheless,
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these are preliminary interpretations, and further investigation is required to confirm this
explanation.
Hypothesis 2
It was further hypothesized that the plausibility manipulation would impact both
general and personal plausibility, as prior work has shown prevalence information to
impact both variables. As predicted, providing individuals with information that indicated
that it was likely that they experienced an event significantly impacted change scores on
both general and personal plausibility. Accordingly, this reaffirms the findings of
previous research, which asserts that indicating that an event was likely to have occurred
to similar others in the population is sufficient to change how individuals perceive the
plausibility of the event.
Although the study was not designed to distinguish between general and personal
plausibility, a difference was found in the nature of the marginally significant interactions
between prevalence and exposure on the two variables. For general plausibility,
prevalence information had a significant effect on the control group. Conversely, analysis
of personal plausibility indicated that prevalence information had a significant effect
when combined with visualization, with a minimal impact on ratings for control and
description. This may result as the description and visualization group target self-relevant
details, whereas the prevalence information alone provides a more general argument for
how individuals who are of a specific age range likely experienced the event.
Accordingly, the provision of prevalence information alone may boost the notion that
people, in general, may have undergone the event, whereas self-relevant visualization
may enhance the notion that it was plausible that they, themselves, underwent the event.
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Of note, however, is that the mean scores on general and personal plausibility
decreased numerically post-manipulation for those who were not provided with the
plausibility manipulation, with the exception of the description group on ratings of
personal plausibility. Although not predicted, this indicates that the script information in
the absence of prevalence information may have a negative impact on individuals’
perceptions of the given event, as this may indicate to the individual that the event is
seemingly unfamiliar and was not something that they likely experienced. Conversely,
the mean ratings for the groups who did receive the prevalence information did increase
numerically from baseline across conditions. This reaffirms the assertion made by
Mazzoni et al. (2001) that individuals must first come to believe that an event is plausible
and personally experienced before the final stage in their model in which they experience
the event as if it were a real memory. Accordingly, the absence of the plausibility
manipulation renders any additional manipulations ineffective, as evidenced in the
current study.
Accordingly, although no differences were expected to arise between the different
types of plausibility, as the provision of prevalence information has often impacted both
in previous studies, these results suggest that the way that individuals internally evaluate
these two constructs varies. Nevertheless, this is a tentative interpretation based on two
non-significant trends. Further data collection is needed to clarify these findings.
Hypothesis 3 & 4
Although it was hypothesized that the primary effects of the imagination inflation
design would be seen in inflation in autobiographical belief, no significant results were
found for either prevalence information or the different levels of exposure. Additionally,
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it was hypothesized that memory ratings would increase when the plausibility
manipulation was followed by the generation of vivid imagery. Again, no significant
results were found.
This may indicate that the results obtained by previous imagination inflation
studies were not reflecting autobiographical memories, or changes in estimated likelihood
that events occurred, as previously asserted. Rather, inflation in confidence may have
been due to increases in personal plausibility. This conclusion, however, is premature due
to the limited sample utilized in the current study. Further investigation is thus warranted
to determine if prevalence and exposure do impact other aspects of the nested model.
Nevertheless, this reinforces the importance of using the Autobiographical Beliefs and
Memory Questionnaire, as the LEI groups all possible effects into one variable rather
than separating out the constructs to identify what the individual is endorsing.
The predictions asserting that autobiographical belief and memory would be
impacted by the manipulations were generated on the premise that source monitoring
errors would arise in the prevalence conditions with increased exposure. Based on the
results, it appears that no source monitoring errors occurred. Two primary explanations
can account for this finding. First, it is possible that prevalence information does not
result in source monitoring errors and, as seen within this study, only impacts plausibility,
at least in the short term. This finding may not have arisen in previous studies, as no prior
study has utilized imagination while simultaneously distinguishing between the
subcomponents of the nested model.
Another explanation to account for this is the lack of time between administering
the experimental manipulation and the post-manipulation measures. Participants
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completed the measures directly after reading the narrative and engaging in the
experimental tasks. This likely made it easy for individuals to attribute their knowledge
of the event to the manipulation, as there would still be a strong association between the
details provided and their source (Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2007). Underwood and
Pezdek (1998) assert that if the individual recalls information “soon after reading it, the
recency of the encoding ensures that [both] the message and the source are available in
memory” (p. 450); only with time do the message and the source become less associated.
Accordingly, it is understandable why source confusion may not have occurred after such
a short interval in the current study. Nevertheless, this does not explain why significant
results were found in other studies that administered the measures directly after the
experimental manipulation (Sharman, Mazonni, & Memon, 2005; Garry, Manning,
Loftus, & Sherman, 1996).
Analysis o f Change Proportions
The effects found when analyzing the proportions of participants who increased in
ratings for general plausibility generally reflected the results obtained from the change
score analyses. When comparing individuals at the different levels of exposure with and
without the provision of prevalence information, both analyses indicated a significant
difference for individuals in the control group. Similarly, for personal plausibility, both
analyses indicated a significant difference between individuals in the visualization group
when comparing those who were and who were not provided with prevalence
information. This reinforces that the results obtained in the analysis of variance were not
unduly influenced by a few individuals’ indicating large margins of change. Additionally,
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for both analyses, no differences were found between groups on ratings of memory or on
the LEI.
However, the analysis for the logistic regression did differ from the findings from
the ANOVA for belief. Whereas change scores were not significantly different between
any of the groups on belief ratings, the logistic regression and subsequent Chi Square
tests demonstrated a significant difference between individuals in the control condition
who were and were not provided with prevalence information. This may suggest that
although people did increase their ratings post-manipulation, these changes were
minimal. Further, the logistic regression only looked at individuals who increased in
score, and did not take into account individuals whose scores fluctuated in the opposite
direction. Accordingly, although a significant amount of people in the control condition
may have increased their ratings post-manipulation when provided with prevalence
information, when their ratings were combined with the ratings that decreased post
manipulation, no overall change was found.
Hypothesis 5
This study does, however, reinforce the predictions of the nested model. Although
change scores varied across the different levels of the nested model, the actual baseline
and post-manipulation scores for memory when the target events were combined were
less than or equal to those of belief, which were less than or equal to those of personal
plausibility, which, in turn, were less than or equal to those of general plausibility. In
addition to providing support for the nested model, this also indicates an additional
consideration to take when interpreting the results, as there is more room for scores to
increase on constructs such as belief and memory, which were initially rated low,
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whereas constructs that were initially rated as more likely have less room for upward
movement in subsequent ratings.
Limitations
It is difficult to compare the present study to previous studies, as prior work in the
imagination inflation literature has only utilized the LEI. However, in looking at this
variable, it is still of interest to understand differences between the current study and
those previously conducted to understand what may have impacted the current results.
For one, systematic methodological differences, such as including the “Where’s Waldo”
distracter task, may have affected individual ratings. Although this was meant to control
for time for processing amongst the different conditions, any time that could have been
utilized to deliberate over the nature of the target events was thus obstructed. In other
studies, participants have been able to freely process the information presented prior to
making post-manipulation ratings. Further research would be needed to evaluate the
impact of this task on the dependent variables.
Although other differences can be found between the current procedure and those
in other studies that evaluated confidence ratings on the LEI, such as providing different
rationales for completing the time two measures, many of these differences are also
apparent amongst previously published studies and yet significant results are reported
therein. Of note, however, is that sample sizes in the present study were relatively small,
which may have hindered the ability to detect significant results. Still, other studies have
used fewer participants and have still obtained significant results (e.g. Garry, Manning
Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). As well, whereas other studies have provided individuals with
more than one event and have analyzed the aggregate scores, the current study only
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exposed individuals to one target event. Accordingly, other studies are more likely to
indicate statistical increases. However, the influence of imagining single versus multiple
events upon imagination inflation results is not too well understood. Nevertheless,
research by Mazzoni & Memon (2003), Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch (2001), and Scoboria
et al (2006) do provide evidence that using a single target event can also produce
significant results.
A potential disadvantage to the current design was that individuals had to generate
the explanations and visualizations out loud in a one-on-one situation with the research
assistant. This may have affected some individuals’ responses due to any stress or anxiety
elicited by the demands of the situation. This, in turn, may have affected some
participants’ level of engagement with the task, as they may have been distracted by these
extraneous factors. Determining whether a one-on-one paradigm or providing
individuals with the same instructions in written form (Sharman, Manning, and Garry,
2005) has different effects on individuals warrants further investigation.
Future Directions
As aforementioned, this study reveals several potential lines of research that
would be valuable. For one, further investigation is required to determine whether the
LEI and belief measure on the ABMQ tap the same construct. This can be investigated by
implementing a single design that varies in the measures administered to participants. By
determining the impact of the same manipulation on the presentation of the LEI alone,
the LEI with the ABMQ, and the AMBQ alone, the nature of what is being evaluated by
individuals can be interpreted in greater detail. As well, it would be of value to determine
the different ways in which individuals internally evaluate general and personal
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plausibility, as the tentative interpretation presented within this study was based on two
non-significant trends. Further data collection is needed to separate how the information
is processed in regard to these two constructs. As well, follow up questions elaborating
on the questions in the ABMQ, perhaps asking individuals why they rated each construct
as they did, would be extremely beneficial.
Further, to determine whether descriptions, visualizations, and/or plausibility can
lead to source monitoring errors and, accordingly, changes in belief or memory,
incorporating the ABMQ in a study that allows greater time between the manipulations
and post-manipulation measures is needed.
Additionally, individuals’ fluency in generating their descriptions and
visualizations may impact their perception of whether it was likely that they encountered
the event post manipulation. For individuals who had more difficulty generating a
scenario, it is likely that they would deem it less likely to have occurred than an
individual who is able to construct the scenario with relatively little effort. Similarly,
individual differences in participants’ abilities to describe or visualize events may have
influenced the findings. The degree to which individuals are able to engage more fully in
the description or visualization may impact the degree to which the manipulation impacts
their responding. Accordingly, analyzing individuals who were more efficient at
engaging in the description or visualization tasks may result in different outcomes. This is
worthy of further investigation, and could be accomplished by analyzing the recordings
of the sessions and coding items such as how long it takes individuals to begin their
narrative, narrative length, amount and complexity of self-relevant details (Desjardins &
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Scoboria, 2007), and other elements such as visual, auditory, and emotional features
(Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003)
As well, as aforementioned, determining whether a one-on-one paradigm or
providing individuals with the same instructions in written form has different effects on
individuals warrants further investigation. Again, this can be conducted through
designing a study that contains identical procedures and manipulations, except for the
manner in which the visualization task is conducted.
This study demonstrates that the imagination inflation procedures are more
intricate than have previously been acknowledged. The results generated within the
imagination inflation design do not appear to be straightforward but, rather, can be
impacted by a range of factors, with plausibility being an essential element which must
develop before other processes, such as belief and memory, can be enhanced. However, it
is apparent that the different elements within the imagination inflation design do impact
different processes, and further research is needed to clarify these elements.
This has several implications, as telling individuals that they likely did experience an
event in either therapy or legal/forensic settings could impact how they perceive the
situation, especially when followed by additional manipulations. Clinically, practitioners
must understand the implications of the techniques that they implement during sessions.
For example, practitioners should be aware that prompting individuals who cannot
remember whether an event such as sexual abuse occurred by telling them that it is likely,
given their symptoms, that they did experience the event, is likely to alter the client’s
perception of the event. Similarly, in legal and forensic domains, prosecutors should be
aware that eliciting responses by asserting that all the evidence points to an event having
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played out a certain way, or encouraging jurors to vividly imagine events also likely
alters the perceptions of the event in question. Additionally, interviewers and legal
professionals may also be interested in the distinction between plausibility, belief, and
memory to verify what type of “memory” forms the basis for witness’ recall.
Further investigation is warranted to determine whether prevalence information
and different levels of exposure to events do impact areas other than plausibility.
Additional work is also needed to understand the implications of enhanced plausibility
upon subsequent decision making. Given the wide variety of methods implemented
within various therapeutic techniques and the nature of both interviews and interrogations
in legal settings, this research is essential to further understand the different components
and implications of imaginative manipulations.
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Appendix A
Number of Participants per Cell for Adjusted Sample

No Prevalence

Exposure

Prevalence

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample
r

r P ° n^
Density

n

n

n

n

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

8

12

11

10

Description

11

11

13

9

Visualization

13

10

11

9

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

8

12

11

10

Description

11

11

13

10

Visualization

13

10

11

10

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

8

12

10

10

Description

12

11

13

8

Visualization

13

10

11

9

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

8

13

11

10

Description

12

11

11

10

Visualization

13

9

11

7

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

8

11

11

10

Description

11

11

13

10

Visualization

12

10

10

10
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Appendix B
Life Events Inventory (LEI)

LIFE EVENTS INVENTORY

This questionnaire is to establish the frequency with which certain events occur before the age of ten.
Please indicate on the scale how confident you are that a certain event did or did not happen before
you were six years old:

Definitely

Definitely

did not

did

1.

Losing a toy

happen________________________happen
1
2
4
7
8
3
5
6

2.

Seeing or hearing a real ghost

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

3.

Having a baby tooth removed by a dentist

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

4.

Receiving a bone density screening

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

5.

Choking on a small object

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

7.

Having a skin sample taken by a nurse at
school
Receiving a rectal enema

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

8.

Breaking a window with your hand

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9.

Getting loss in a mall

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10.

Calling 911

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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Appendix C
Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ)
Childhood E vent Inventory

Below are some events that may or may not happen to people before the age of 6. Please answer
four questions about each event.
The first question has to do with how plausible it is that events like this happen to people in
general. The second question asks how plausible it is that events like this could have happened to
you. There are many events that may happen to some people in general but are not plausible for
you (e.g. it is very plausible that many people got stung by a hornet when they were younger,
regardless of whether they remember it; however, you may have grown up in an area of the world
with no hornets and so it is unlikely that this could have happened to you, whether or not it did)
Also, many things happen that people do not remember having happened. People can know
something happened to them, without remembering the event (for example, you probably know
where you were bom, even though you don’t remember being bom). Therefore, the third
question asks your belief as to whether you think the event happened to you while the fourth
question asks whether you actually remember this event.
Lastly, please keep in mind that all the following events ask questions about events that happen at
or before the age of 6...
Event 1. Losing a toy, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
1
2
people, before the age of 6, lose a toy?

Extremely
Plausible
3

4

6

5

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have lost a toy?

1

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

1

2

7

8

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember losing a toy
before you were the age of 6?

8

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact lose a
toy?

7

3

4

5
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Event 2. Seeing or hearing a real ghost, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, see or hear
1
2
3
4
a real ghost?

Extremely
Plausible
5

6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have seen or heard a real ghost?

1

2

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

6

3

4

5

6

3

4

5

6

9Z

6

1

2

't
j

A

•J

1

2

8

7

8

7

8

O

3

/

9

sO

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember having a
tooth extracted by a dentist before you
were the age of 6?

7

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact have a
tooth extracted by a dentist?

8

Extremely
Plausible

Not at all
Plausible
11

7

Clear and
complete memory
of event

Event 3. Having a tooth extracted by a dentist, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, have a
1
2
3
4
5
tooth extracted by a dentist?

B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have had a tooth extracted by a
dentist?

8

Definitely did
happen

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember seeing or
hearing a real ghost before you were the
age of 6?

7

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact see or
hear a real ghost?

65

3

4

5
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Event 4. Receiving a bone density screening, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, receive a
1
2
3
4
bone density screening?

Extremely
Plausible
5

6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have received a bone density
screening?

1

2

1

2

3

A

s

.J

1

2

8

f.U

3

7/

o8

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember receiving a
bone density screening before you were
the age of 6?

7

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact receive
a bone density screening?

66

3

4

5

6

7

8

Event 5. Choking on a small object, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible

Extremely
Plausible

Not at all
Plausible

Extremely
Plausible

A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, choke on a
small object?

B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have choked on a small object?

1

2

3

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact choke
on a small object?

1

2

3

Definitely did
happen
6

7

8

Clear and

No memory of
event at all

complete memory
of event

D. Do you actually remember choking on
a small object before you were the age
of 6?
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Event 6. Having a skin sample taken by a nurse at school, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, have a
skin sample taken by a nurse at
school?
Not at all
Plausible

67

Extremely
Plausible

Extremely
Plausible

B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have had a skin sample taken by a
nurse at school?
Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact have a
skin sample taken by a nurse at
school?

1

2

Definitely did
happen

3
Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember having a skin
sample taken by a nurse at school before
you were the age of 6?
Event 7. Receiving a rectal enema, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, receive a
1
2
3
rectal enema?

Extremely
Plausible
6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have received a rectal enema?

1

1

8

Extremely
Plausible
2

3

6

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact receive
a rectal enema?

7

2

No memory of
event at all

7

8

Definitely did
happen

3

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

D. Do you actually remember receiving a
rectal enema before you were the age
of 6?
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Event 8. Breaking a window with your hand, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, break a
4
1
2
3
window with their hand?

Extremely
Plausible
5

6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have broken a window with your
hand?

1

?

1

2

3

J

4

s

1

2

8

\J

3

7/

8
O

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember breaking a
window with your hand before you
were the age of 6?

7

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact break a
window with your hand?

68

3

4

5

6

7

8

Event 9. Getting lost in a shopping mall,
at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
people, before the age of 6, get lost in
a shopping mall?

1

2

Extremely
Plausible
3

4

5

6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have gotten lost in a shopping mall?

1

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

1

2

7

8

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember getting lost
in a shopping mall before you were
the age of 6?

8

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact get lost
in a shopping mall?

7

3

4

5
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Event 10. Calling 911, at or before the age of 6.
Not at all
Plausible
A. How plausible is it that at least some
1
2
people, before the age of 6, call 911?

Extremely
Plausible
3

4

5

6

Not at all
Plausible
B. How plausible is it that you
personally, before the age of 6, could
have called 911?

1

2

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

8

6

3

7

8

Definitely did
happen
4

5

6

7

8

Clear and
complete memory
of event

No memory of
event at all
D. Do you actually remember calling 911
before you were the age of 6?

7

Extremely
Plausible

Definitely did not
Happen
C. How likely is it that you personally,
before the age of 6, did in fact call
911?

69

3

4

5
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Appendix D
Script and Prevalence Information

Dual Energy X-Ray Absorpitometry (DEXA) Screenings
A DEXA (Dual Energy X-ray Absorpitometry) screening is a relatively simple procedure
conducted to determine the strength of ones bones relative to individuals who have
healthy bones. This is, primarily, done in order to determine if the patient’s bones are at
greater risk for breaking than normally. The procedure is conducted by a radiology
technician, and a family member may accompany the patient, providing there is no risk
due to minor exposure to x-rays (such as pregnancy).
The DEXA bone density test takes between 10 and 30 minutes, depending on the
equipment used and the parts of the body being examined. The patient is asked to undress
and to remove any objects from the body (jewelry, watches, wallets, etc.), and put on a
hospital gown. Then, the patient lies on a padded table with an x-ray generator below and
a detector (an imaging device) above. The patient is asked to lie extremely still during the
procedure. The DEXA machine sends a thin, invisible beam of low-dose x-rays through
the patient’s bones via two energy streams, one that is absorbed by soft tissue and the
other by bone; the detector is slowly passed over the area being examined, generating
images on a computer monitor. The DEXA procedure is safe, and there is no discomfort
or adverse reactions afterwards.
[Script ends here fo r non-prevalence groups - prevalence information follows]
Bone density screenings have been performed in the United States and Canada for more
than 50 years. As medical science advanced in the 1950s and 1960s, more efficient
methods for detecting weaknesses in bone density were developed. Due to these
advances, the rate of diagnoses of brittle bone disease in children jumped from 2% to
10% in the 1960’s. However little was known about what factors put children at risk for
developing weak bones. Because there were so many injuries and so little research
performed, great efforts were taken to better understand this disease in hopes of lowering
the prevalence in the population. The Canadian Academy of Pediatrics recommended in
1975 that bone density screenings for brittle bone disease be conducted routinely in
children. This was due in part to the new knowledge that came about in the late 60’s in
regards to the prevalence of brittle bone disease and its complications in children as they
matured. It was thought that early detection of this disease could prevent future
problems, including the prevention of skeletal deformities.
One method which became widely used as a screening and diagnostic device was the
DEXA (Dual Energy X-ray Absorpitometry) technique. The use of DEXA for bone
density screenings became very common. The Canadian Medical Association states that
approximately 85% of all children born in Ontario between 1991 and 1994 had this
routine procedure performed on them, a statistic that is confirmed by billing records
submitted to OHIP during that period. The procedures were also described as “quite
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common” in other provinces. Parents were encouraged to have their children receive this
screening procedure after the age of 3 (when the skeletal system is sufficiently developed
to conduct the procedure safely), but before the age of 5.
There were few side effects after the procedure was performed. However, some parents
considered the exposure to x-rays too high a risk for their children, and the benefit too
small. Risk factors for brittle bone disease were identified in 1994, so that all children no
longer needed to be tested. Furthermore, the risk of developing brittle bone disease
dropped significantly, suggesting that environmental factors had been responsible for
higher prevalence rates in the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid 1990s, the practice of
routinely giving children DEXA screenings had mostly ceased, and OHIP stopped
reimbursing for the procedure in 1995.
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Papilloma Vims Screenings
The Human Papilloma Vims (HPV) is associated with the development of common
warts. Although the vims is only contagious when there are actual warts on the skin’s
surface, once infected, the vims remains in their body. The screening for HPV is a
relatively simple procedure conducted to determine whether an individual carries the
vims, regardless of whether there are any physical symptoms apparent. Either a doctor or
a nurse can conduct this screening.
The procedure is performed in an outpatient setting and takes between 10 to 15 minutes.
The skin is first thoroughly cleaned using an antiseptic cloth to reduce the risk of
infection. The medical professional then numbs the area by making a small injection of a
local anesthetic. A sample of skin is then taken by a biopsy from the numb area of the
skin. Finally, a Band-Aid dressing is used to cover the biopsy site, and the area should be
kept dry for 12-24 hours. Generally, the skin heals easily within one to two weeks. After
the biopsy the skin sample is processed in a laboratory and the results are made available
to the doctor or referring source within two weeks. The HPV Screening procedure is safe,
and there is little to no discomfort or adverse reactions afterwards.
[Script ends here fo r non-prevalence groups - prevalence information follo ws]
Warts are a common skin affliction that many individuals are susceptible to both in
childhood and as an adult.
Caused by the Human Papilloma Virus (HPV), warts can take various forms, usually
appearing as small contusions, bumps, or, at times, as thick spots in more hard-wearing
areas. Although they can occur in several places, warts are typically contracted on either
the skin of the hands or the soles of the feet. Although some people are more naturally
resistant to the HPV viruses, warts on the skin are often easily transmitted to others upon
contact. This can include either direct contact or from sharing objects with an individual
who has warts.
Because of the potential invisibility of the wart virus and the fact that young children
often share toys and other objects, school boards across Canada, in conjunction with
Government Health Officials, piloted a Papilloma Vims screening as a preventative
measure for children entering the school system. The procedure, which was conducted
prior to the beginning of the school year, consisted of having a school nurse take a small
sample of skin from the index finger of each child. The sample was to be analyzed to
determine if the child had had exposure to the vims. The entire process was very quick
and relatively painless.
If an individual tested positive, this information was noted on their school record, and
teachers were required to check each of these children’s hands every morning before they
would enter the classroom. If a wart was visible on the hand of any given individual, the
affected area was to be covered with a bandage in order to reduce the risk that they would
spread it to other children.
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This program was in place from 1983-1993, after which point it was terminated due to a
lack of justification for its use. Only about 0.5% of all children entering school ever
tested positive for the virus. Records from OHIP and BC Health indicate that over 93% of
parents agreed to have their children screened for the virus. However, once accumulated
data showed that the number of children entering school with the virus was minimal, they
discontinued their funding of the program.
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Appendix E
Diabetes Narrative

Personal Story.
Diabetes.
Every parent breathes a sign of relief at the birth of a healthy baby. If only we could keep
our children that way.
At first glance, many kids seem perfectly fit. However, in between the chicken pox and
common colds, the skinned knees and bouts of bruised feelings, a chronic condition can
invade their young bodies like an uninvited guest who does not know when to leave.
Every year more than 13,000 American children are diagnosed with juvenile, or Type 1,
diabetes. In Type 1 diabetes, the pancreas does not produce insulin needed by body cells
to use glucose - a form of sugar produced when food is digested - as fuel for energy.
Without insulin, glucose builds up in the bloodstream and overflows into the urine. These
children must replace natural insulin levels every day with multiple injections or by
wearing pumps that continuously deliver small increments of insulin through a small tube
or needle inserted under the skin.
Once children develop diabetes, they never outgrow it. And every family remembers
when diabetes enters their lives. "It is, I think, a more memorable day than my birthday,"
says Melissa, 17. She was diagnosed Sept. 16, 1992 - her third day of fourth grade.
Melissa had been excited about that school year and had gotten the teacher she wanted.
Then her mother, Renee, showed up at class with the principal. Melissa was going to
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia. Renee had mentioned to a friend, who was a
pediatric nurse, that Melissa had been experiencing excessive thirst and frequent
urination - two common symptoms of diabetes. She took a sample of her daughter's urine
to their pediatrician's office for testing to confirm her suspicions.
When 9-year-old Melissa first heard she had diabetes, she asked, "Does this mean I'm
going to die?"
"No, but it means you're going to live differently," the pediatrician replied.
Melissa spent five days at CHOP where her family's diabetes education began.
“It’s not going to go away and ... no one can really understand,” says Melissa, who
controls her diabetes with an insulin pump. “No one can know what it’s like to live with
[diabetes].”
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Diabetes makes Melissa feel different. “I’ll never be them. I’ll never be that normal kid
over there. I can’t go back to how things were.” Melissa remembers when she did not
have diabetes.
However, she adds, “a lot of my childhood memories are of having diabetes.” Such as:
-

-

The well-meaning parents who skipped over her at birthday parties when they
passed out cupcakes ...
The substitute teacher in sixth grade who sent her out in the hall in tears to finish
her lunch one day ...
The times she was late getting to the school cafeteria because she had to check her
blood sugar first and could not sit with her friends ...
The sleepovers where her friends snacked on popcorn and soft drinks while she
could only watch ...
The meals where she patiently waited at the dinner table for her blood sugar to
drop so she could eat.

“You just can’t take a vacation from it,” says Melissa. “No matter what you’re feeling,
you have to deal with it. And you have to deal with it responsibly. To this day, I don’t
think I’ve ever lied about what my blood sugar was. I wouldn’t have felt right.”
Despite carefully monitoring her glucose levels, Melissa - like anyone else with diabetes
- still has fluctuating blood sugars. “You feel like you’re failing,” she said. “I know now
that it’s not anything I did wrong.”
Often, however, Melissa kept her frustrations to herself. “A lot of times, I didn’t share all
that I was feeling ... I think there were times when it was harder than I was admitting to,”
Melissa confesses. “I really don’t want to do this anymore, but I know I have to.”
Kids who manage their diabetes responsibly have an additional burden, notes Melissa’s
mother, Renee. “They feel like they can’t let their parents down.” However, fluctuating
blood sugars can be more than a potential source of disappointment to a child’s parents.
Sometimes, Melissa admitted, she feels like an added burden to her family. “It’s not like
[your] parents can just say, ‘Oh, no, you’re not,”’ she said, “and [the feeling] just goes
away.”
Melissa took complete charge of managing her diabetes when she started using an insulin
pump several years ago. “I didn’t understand how the pump worked,” her mother Renee
confesses. She also relinquished keeping detailed records of her daughter’s blood sugars.
“I think it’s harder to let go when you’re still doing the record keeping,” she adds.
Despite her independence in managing her condition, Melissa realizes she still needs
occasional help. When her class went on an overnight trip in the fall, Melissa’s blood
sugar plummeted during the night. When her blood sugar drops, she says, “I feel shaky
and can’t think straight.”
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Her best friend and roommate brought Melissa her glucometer to check her blood sugar
and got her juice to raise her glucose level. “I’m so used to someone being there,”
Melissa admits.
When she enrolls in college, the learning curve will start over. “How am I going to be
able to do this?” Melissa wonders.
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Appendix F
Informed Consent
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Comparing Perceptions of Medical Narratives and Attentional Abilities.
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Alan Scoboria and Dana
Shapero, MA Candidate, from the Department of Psychology at the University of Windsor. This
research is not presently funded by any granting agency.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Dana Shapero at
shapero@uWindsor.ca, or Dr. Scoboria at 519-253-3000, x4090, email: scoboria@uwindsor.ca.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between individuals’ perceptions of
different medical narratives and their performance on various attentional exercises.
PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things:
•
•

You will log into a web site, and answer questions a number of childhood events.
You will come in person 2 weeks later, at which time you will:
o Read articles, and rate the quality of the writing of the articles,
o Complete a series of questionnaires,
o Write briefly about each of the articles you read,
o Complete a series of attentional activities

The study will take 1 hour to complete; 15 minutes for session 1, and 45 minutes for session 2.
The study will take part via a web page (Session 1), and in person (Session 2). Session 2 will take
place in a computer lab at the University of Windsor. Upon completion of the experimental
session, your involvement in the study will be complete.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no foreseeable risks, discomforts, or inconveniences, be they physical, psychological,
emotional, financial, or social, associated with this research.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
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This research will aid us in understanding how college students understand different types of
medical information. Participants may benefit from increased knowledge regarding this issue,
which will be provided during the debriefing at the end of the experimental session.
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
Participants will not receive any financial compensation for their involvement. Participants are
eligible for up to two (2) bonus points for their involvement through the psychology participant
pool, if in an eligible psychology course.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you
will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. You will be asked to
provide identifying information, so that the data from the two sessions can be linked. Once you
have completed the study, identifying information will be removed. Your responses will therefore
be anonymous once the study is complete.
Upon completion, the information you provide will not be associated with any identifying
information. Once the data is collected, there is no method by which we can link your data to you
personally. Informed consent forms and data will be stored separately in a locked filing cabinet;
these forms will be retained for six years and then will be destroyed. Any reports or publications
produced from this research will be general in nature, and will not specifically refer to any
individual participant’s responses. Paper records of data will be destroyed after they are entered
into an electronic file. No information regarding your participation in this study will be released,
with the exception of informing the participant pool coordinator so that you may receive course
credit as discussed above.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may
withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may also refuse to answer any
questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw
you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so; you will still receive credit
for your participation if you have started to take part in the study. You may choose to remove
your data from the study.
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS
Research findings will be made available to all interested parties upon completion, on the
Research Ethics Board web site (www.uwindsor.ca/REB). These results will be available as of
December 01, 2007.
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
At times it may be necessary to analyze data in conjunction with data from other studies. I agree
that this data can be used in subsequent studies.
Do you give consent for the subsequent use of the data from this study? □ Yes
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RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you
have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3916; e-mail:
lbunn @uwindsor.ca.
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study Comparing Perceptions of Medical
Narratives and Attentional Abilities as described herein. My questions have been answered to
my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Name of Subject
Signature of Subject

Date

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
Signature of Investigator

Date
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CONSENT FOR AUDIO TAPING

Research Subject Name: _________________________________
Title of the Project: Comparing Perceptions of Medical Narratives and Attentional
Abilities

I consent to the audio-taping of the procedures involved in this study.
I understand these are voluntary procedures and that I am free to withdraw at any time by
requesting that the taping be stopped. I also understand that my name will not be revealed to
anyone and that taping will be kept confidential. Tapes are filed by number only and store in
a locked cabinet.
I understand that confidentiality will be respected and the viewing of materials will be for
professional use only.

(Signature of Research Subject)

(Date)
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Appendix G
Analysis of Variance and Analysis of Covariance for Adjusted Dataset

Analysis of Variance Tests
Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r General Plausibility Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Corrected Model

20.05(a)

5.00

0.73

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

4.01

1.46

0.21

1.00

0.73

0.26

0.61

10.62

1.00

10.62

3.86

0.52

Exposure

0.22

2.00

0.11

0.04

0.96

Prevalence x Exposure

9.62

2.00

4.81

1.75

0.18

Error

335.17

122.00

2.75

Total

356.00

128.00

Corrected Total

355.22

127.00

Intercept
Prevalence

df

a R Squared = .06 (Adjusted R Squared = .02)

Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Personal Plausibility Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

28.21(a)

5.00

5.64

2.44

0.04

Intercept

8.43

1.00

8.42

3.65

0.06

13.16

1.00

13.16

5.69

0.02

5.12

2.00

2.56

1.11

0.33

10.38

2.00

5.19

2.25

0.11

Error

286.41

124.00

2.31

Total

323.00

130.00

Corrected Total

314.62

129.00

Prevalence
Exposure
Prevalence x Exposure

a R Squared = .09 (Adjusted R Squared = .05)
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Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Autobiographical B elief Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

6.72(a)

5.00

1.35

1.19

0.33

Intercept

1.67

1.00

1.67

1.48

0.23

Prevalence

0.91

1.00

0.91

0.80

0.37

Exposure

2.55

2.00

1.28

1.13

0.33

Prevalence x Exposure

3.33

2.00

1.66

1.47

0.23

Error

136.51

121.00

1.13

Total

145.00

127.00

Corrected Total

143.23

126.00

a R Squared = .05 (Adjusted R Squared = .01)

Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Memory Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

0.13(a)

5.00

0.03

1.08

0.38

Intercept

0.01

1.00

0.01

0.30

0.58

Prevalence

0.01

1.00

0.01

0.36

0.55

Exposure

0.10

2.00

0.05

2.14

0.12

Prevalence x Exposure

0.01

2.00

0.01

0.27

0.77

Error

2.86

120.00

0.02

Total

3.00

126.00

Corrected Total

2.99

125.00

a R Squared = .04 (Adjusted R Squared = .00)
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Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r LEI Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

1.82(a)

5.00

0.36

0.53

0.75

Intercept

2.17

1.00

2.17

3.17

0.08

Prevalence

1.22

1.00

1.22

1.79

0.18

Exposure

0.33

2.00

0.16

0.24

0.79

Prevalence x Exposure

0.18

2.00

0.09

0.13

0.88

Error

82.91

121.00

0.69

Total

87.00

127.00

Corrected Total

84.72

126.00

a R Squared = .02 (Adjusted R Squared = -.02)

Analysis of Covariate Tests

Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r General Plausibility Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

76.03(a)

6.00

12.67

5.49

0.00

Intercept

53.47

1.00

53.47

23.17

0.00

Time 1 GP Rating

55.98

1.00

55.98

24.26

0.00

Prevalence

9.89

1.00

9.89

4.29

0.04

Exposure

0.07

2.00

0.03

0.01

0.99

13.48

2.00

6.74

2.92

0.06

Error

279.19

121.00

2.31

Total

356.00

128.00

Corrected Total

355.22

127.00

Prevalence x Exposure

a R Squared = .21 (Adjusted R Squared = .18)
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Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Personal Plausibility Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

42.00(a)

6.00

7.00

3.16

0.01

Intercept

22.07

1.00

22.07

9.96

0.00

Time 1 GP Rating

13.79

1.00

13.79

6.22

0.01

Prevalence

11.84

1.00

11.84

5.34

0.02

Exposure

5.79

2.00

2.89

1.31

0.28

Prevalence x Exposure

8.02

2.00

4.01

1.81

0.16

Error

272.62

123.00

2.22

Total

323.00

130.00

Corrected Total

314.62

129.00

a R Squared = .13 (Adjusted R Squared = .09)

Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Autobiographical Belief Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

55.10(a)

6.00

9.18

12.40

0.00

Intercept

27.13

1.00

27.13

36.65

0.00

Time 1 GP Rating

48.26

1.00

48.26

65.18

0.00

Prevalence

1.54

1.00

1.54

2.08

0.15

Exposure

0.99

2.00

0.49

0.67

0.51

Prevalence x Exposure

1.21

2.00

0.60

0.81

0.45

Error

88.12

119.00

0.74

Total

145.00

126.00

Corrected Total

143.21

125.00

a R Squared = .39 (Adjusted R Squared = .35)
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Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r Memory Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Corrected Model

0.43(a)

6.00

0.07

3.30

0.01

Intercept

0.31

1.00

0.31

14.17

0.00

Time 1 GP Rating

0.29

1.00

0.29

13.84

0.00

Prevalence

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.20

0.65

Exposure

0.06

2.00

0.03

1.45

0.24

Prevalence x Exposure

0.00

2.00

0.00

0.02

0.98

Error

2.57

119.00

0.02

Total

3.00

126.00

Corrected Total

2.99

125.00

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

a R Squared = .14 (Adjusted R Squared = .09)

Test o f Between-Subjects Effects fo r LEI Ratings (for Target Event)

Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

7.63(a)

6.00

1.27

1.98

0.07

Intercept

7.98

1.00

7.98

12.42

0.00

Time 1 GP Rating

5.81

1.00

5.81

9.05

0.00

Prevalence

1.54

1.00

1.54

2.39

0.13

Exposure

0.68

2.00

0.34

0.53

0.59

Prevalence x Exposure

0.28

2.00

0.14

0.22

0.80

Error

77.09

120.00

0.64

Total

87.00

127.00

Corrected Total

84.72

126.00

a R Squared = .09 (Adjusted R Squared = .05)
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Appendix H
Time 2 Scores and Standard Deviations for Adjusted Sample

No Prevalence

Exposure

Prevalence

Skin Sample

Bone Density

Skin Sample

Mean

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

Bone
Density

SD

Mean

SD

General Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

3.50

2.07

5.08

2.39

6.27

1.68

6.10

2.23

Description

4.73

2.19

6.27

1.49

5.46

1.94

4.89

2.15

Visualization

5.46

2.07

5.70

2.16

6.00

1.48

5.22

2.17

Personal Plausibility (ABMQ)
Control

2.37

2.13

3.00

2.63

3.91

2.26

2.70

2.00

Description

3.18

2.09

3.91

2.95

3.46

1.89

4.00

2.71

Visualization

3.62

2.06

3.10

2.60

3.36

2.16

4.60

2.59

Belief (ABMQ)
Control

1.38

0.74

1.75

1.60

2.22

1.30

1.80

0.92

Description

1.75

0.97

1.27

0.47

1.93

1.04

1.88

1.13

Visualization

1.77

1.09

1.60

0.84

1.73

1.01

1.67

0.71

Memory (ABMQ)
Control

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.09

0.00

1.00

0.00

Description

1.08

0.29

1.00

0.00

1.09

0.30

1.00

0.00

Visualization

1.00

0.00

1.11

0.33

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

Life Events Inventory (LEI)
Control

1.50

0.76

1.45

0.82

2.09

1.87

1.40

0.69

Description

2.09

1.58

1.09

0.30

2.23

1.01

1.90

0.99

Visualization

1.50

0.67

1.40

0.69

1.90

0.00

1.20

0.63
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Appendix I
Graphical Depiction of the Effects of the Manipulations
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